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The Development of Elementary and
Secondary Education Policy in the
Minnesota Legislature
JOYCE KRUPEY* and GENE MAMMENGA**
ABSTRACT-This discussion of the political climate in which elementary and secondary education is funded in
Minnesota begins with the Minnesota Miracle of 1971. In each successive legislative session some adjustments
have been made in this formula. In this paper we describe the various lobbying groups that try to affect education legislation. We also discuss the role played by the governor, key legislators, legislative and Department of
Education staff, the State Board of Education, and the commissioner of education in educational policy formation. In conclusio n, we summarize major formula changes since 1971 and review the many education-related
issues before the legislature during the 1985 session. We conclude that major public education decisions are
ultimately made by a few key legislators and legislative staff, although input is provided by many groups.

Introduction
Minnesota has historically been generous in support of its
public school system. While not a rich state, it has maintained
a place among the top ten states in the United States in terms
of per pupil funding. For the 1982 school year Minnesota
ranked ninth in terms of spending per pupil (1).
At a time when tax reductions are a priority issue with both
political parties, Minnesotans remain willing to forego a portion of a tax cut if the money goes to improving public
schools. Seventy-one percent of those polled in February
1985 said they were willing to make that kind of commitment
to public education (2). Recent national polls asking the same
question show that less than 50% of those polled would be
willing to make a similar commitment (3). The 71% figure reflects an increase of 10 points over a similar poll commissioned five years ago.
This is the framework in which Minnesota's educational
policy is developed. Politicians of both parties are quick to
praise Minnesota's public education system. In the 1978 gubernatorial election, then Governor Rudy Perpich recalled
how public education was a "passport out of poverty" for him
and his brothers, while challenger Congressman Al Quie repeatedly referred to his congressional expertise in education
gained as ranking minority member of the House Labor and
Education Committee. Campaigning on a billion dollar tax
cut, Independent Republicans in 1984 gained control of the
state House of Representatives for the first time in 13 years.
Nevertheless, they established education funding as one of
their top four legislative priorities. These politicians reflect
· · the views of their constituents; Minnesotans believe in public
education and, when made aware of the need, are willing to
pay the price necessary to sustain quality.
Education, therefore, seldom emerges as a controversial

political issue. Minnesota politicians do not choose to run
against public schools. In spite of this, the funding of public
education became, almost inadvertently, a major item in the
1970 Anderson-Head campaign for governor. At a Citizens'
League luncheon in October of that year, Wendell Anderson
proposed what has become known as the Minnesota Miracle,
a major funding change that involved limiting local school tax
levies and shifting the tax burden for education to state income and sales taxes. Prior to this 1971 legislation, the property tax was the major funding source for education in
Minnesota. Rapidly escalating property taxes and wide disparities among school districts in both tax rates and available financial resources per pupil were the primary conditions that
led to the enactment of the Minnesota Miracle. The immediate
objective was to reduce property taxes while allotting more
education monies to property-poor school districts. Dr. Tim
Mazzoni authored an excellent study of how this major
change in educational policy was accomplished ( 4).
The new funding formula underlined Minnesota's willingness to be in the forefront of educational policy-making. For
years afterward, Minnesota legislators and staff were centers
of attention at national meetings where they were repeatedly
asked how the change had been accomplished. The Minnesota formula was one of the first of its type and remains generally admired by school finance scholars. In the 14 years since
this formula was adopted, it has undergone many revisions to
deal with the evolving problems of school districts, but the basic character of the formula remains unchanged.
Few people today remember the intense political fervor of
1971. State newspapers headlined talk of property tax revolts.
However, a Minnesota Proposi'tion 13 movement was shortcircuited by the tax shift included in the new school aid formula. This legislation was vital to all Minnesotans interested
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in educational policy, for it drastically limited the access of local districts to the property tax. It made new funds available to
traditionally low-spending districts. It also focused the attention of many more state legislators on the education aid formula since the formula now so directly affected the state
budget. Finally, it led key legislators not on the education
committees to be interested in the education aids bill, clearly
the biggest money bill of every funding session.
Struggles have ensued on the part of the education interest
groups to adjust the formula to their concept of tax and funding equity every legislative session. A number of groups and
individuals labor full time attempting to influence Minnesota educational policy. These groups are discussed here in
an arbitrary order unrelated to their influence on policy
development.

Lobbying Groups
The Minnesota School Boards Association (MSBA) includes
in its membership all of the 435 state school boards. In addition to providing technical information regarding state laws
and Department of Education rules and regulations to its
members, MSBA also maintains an active lobbying team in St.
Paul. There it vigorously defends the local management rights
of school districts. The MSBAand the teachers' organizations,
the Minnesota Education Association (MEA) and the Minnesota Federation of Teachers (MFT), often take opposing sides
on issues related to collective bargaining and "teacher rights"
such as tenure protection and seniority dismissal.
Some dissension has developed in MSBA ranks over education finance. Metropolitan school boards, especially those of
St. Paul, Minneapolis, and the first ring of suburbs, have felt
that greater organizational priority should be given to increased state funding. In 1967 the Minneapolis school district
assigned one of its administrators to full-time legislative duty.
His skill and aggressiveness encouraged others to consider
similar actions. Immediately prior to the 1973 legislative session, St. Paul hired a former legislator as its first full-time lobbyist. The following year a group of inner-ring, Twin Cities
suburban school districts formed their own lobbying organization called the Association of Metropolitan School Districts
(AMSD). The AMSD districts were experiencing severe enrollment declines coupled with a growing concentration of
highly trained, veteran teachers on their staffs. These staffing
and enrollment patterns were, and still are, similar to those in
Minneapolis and St. Paul schools.
With urban and AMSD districts represented at the legislature, other districts began to realize they also had common interests that should be communicated to legislators. In 1979
many outer-ring suburbs and other outlying districts formed
the Association for Stable and Growing School Districts
(ASGSD). Their initial goal was to equalize access for their
districts to the increased revenue that had become available
to urban and AMSD districts. Like the others, they were remarkably successful in their efforts. In recent years some outlying districts have joined AMSD, making the differences
between the interests of these two associations less clear. It is
interesting to speculate on the dangers of losing focus as an
organization grows larger. It is easier to approach the legislature successfully when objectives are clear and agreed upon
by all members.
Together with the three urban districts, these associations
are in the forefront of efforts to increase educational funding.
While they have remained within the MSBA and continue to
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participate in its delegate assemblies, the AMSD, ASGSD, and
the St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth school districts have
each developed separate legislative goals and, through their
own lobbyists, petitioned the legislature urging support of
these goals. These efforts, the authors believe, have been
effective.
St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth legislators are kept well
informed by their school district lobbyists. Data regarding the
districts are supplied regularly to each legislator who thereby
finds it much easier to be knowledgeable on educational matters than the rural legislator whose legislative district includes
a number of school districts. The staffs of AMSD and ASGSD
perform similar functions. For instance, in making its case for
increased funds , AMSD, with the cooperation of school district business officers, compiles extensive fiscal data including five-year financial projections for each of their districts.
Legislators appreciate this information and, in turn, do what
they can to aid the school districts in their efforts. AMSD has
also been adept at forming a supportive coalition of school
board members, school administrators, teachers, and parents
who have worked together to build a strongly united education community. As a consequence, suburban legislators of
both parties regularly advocate increased educational funding from both state and local tax sources.
The creation of these independent lobbying forces has had
an influence on the nature of the MSBA lobbying effort. A
close relationship has traditionally existed between the small
outstate district and the MSBA office. The smaller district has
to rely on MSBAfor more technical and legal information than
does a larger district, whose size allows for buying independent legal advice and hiring administrative personnel with
the expertise necessary to deal with the technical administrative details.
Outstate districts tend to be more fearful of changes in the
Public Employee Labor Relations Act (PELRA) that broaden
collective bargaining rights. They also share a heightened
concern over legislation supporting school consolidation.
Any efforts in these directions serve as organizational rallying
points for the MSBA. Metropolitan and suburban districts are
much less concerned with such legislation. As a result, some
observers identify MSBA as the voice of Minnesota's smaller
school districts.
School superintendents have several ways of expressing
their policy opinions. Because they deal directly with the Department of Education, their views are immediately available
to the department. They also report directly to local boards of
education, and their ideas are often incorporated into MSBA
legislative programs. Finally, they have their own organization , the Minnesota Association of School Administrators
(MASA). Superintendents and administrators other than principals and assistant principals belong to MASA. MASA concerns itself with certification standards, due process
dismissal, seniority rights, and laws dealing with curriculum
and school discipline.
Elementary and secondary school principals have separate
organizations. The Minnesota Elementary School Principals
Association (MESPA) and the Minnesota Association of Secondary School Principals (MASSP) include principals and assistant principals in their membership. The principals'
organizations are, along with MASA, somewhat hampered in
their lobbying activities because they have a limited professional staff and a large state to cover. Full-time lobbying as
practiced by MEA, MFT, MSBA, and the metropolitan lobbying
groups is impossible for the superintendents' and principals'
j ournal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

organizations. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the positions
held by the school administrators guarantees the attention of
the legislature. Given a reasonable effort to convey their
views to legislative policy-makers, the administrators have an
impact well beyond what their numbers would seem to warrant. They are key figures in the education process, and legislators want to hear from these front-line observers.
The Minnesota Association of School Business Officials
does not maintain a regular lobbying presence at the capitol.
The organization does, however, provide information, advice, and testimony on school district financial matters at appropriate points in the legislative process. Legislators and staff
call upon this organization and its individual members to review suggestions for major changes in fiscal policy and to
provide information on how these changes will affect the fiscal health and management of school districts. The organization does not regularly support a legislative program or
agenda but does provide information on specific fiscal proposals as the occasion arises. In this way, the organization
provides valuable service and has an impact on the policy
process.
The Minnesota teacher groups, the Minnesota Education
Association (MEA) and the Minnesota Federation of Teachers
(MFT), have the numbers the administrators lack, and both
unions consciously and deliberately organize their members
on a statewide basis to actively engage in political activity
aimed at influencing every aspect of public education policy.
Although the MEA and MFT are in an ongoing jurisdictional
battle, the changes each organization seeks in educational
policy differ more in emphasis and style than substance.
These differences are accented when bargaining elections pit
the teacher organizations against each other.
Teacher political activity has become a major ingredient in
educational policy-making. Most teachers have overcome a
prior reluctance to participate in partisan politics. In practice,
they make excellent campaign workers and often play key
roles in individual legislative races. During each legislative
session, many legislators maintain close contact with local
teacher representatives. When an issue such as the right to
strike arouses teacher interest, they direct thousands of calls
and letters to the legislature and are difficult to ignore.
Both teacher groups have full-time lobbyists and spend
considerable time and money reporting daily legislative happenings to their membership. The teacher organizations join
lobbyists from the first-class cities and the AMSD and ASGSD
as the most consistent and outspoken advocates of increased
school funding.
The Parent Teacher Student Association (PTSA) has a
largely unrealized potential as a lobbying group. Legislators
tend to seek and respond to entreaties from those who are interested in education but who are not part of the education
establishment. Parents have the potential to influence educational policy in a way different from the people involved in
school work: teachers, administrators, and board members. It
takes only a few parent letters to make a substantial impression on legislators. As noted earlier, some of the success of the
suburban school districts can be traced to their ability to include parents in their political coalition.
The special education lobby composed almost exclusively
of parents of children with special needs is a prime example
of what a sufficiently motivated parental group can accomplish. During roughly the last 10 to 15 years, the parents of
special needs children have, through persistent lobbying efforts, made public education services available to thousands
Volume 51, Number 3, 1985/86

of children previously unserved. The commitment of these
lay people to this cause brought about dramatic funding increases, making it possible to hire needed professional staff.
In fact, as overall declining enrollments have caused a reduction in the number of classroom teachers, the addition of special education personnel has kept the total teaching cadre at
near static levels.
The special education parent lobbying effort is only one example of the ability of the public to affect educational policy.
In several other areas educators have had able allies in their
struggle to increase funding and expand programs. Vocational education, both secondary and postsecondary, has
been the beneficiary of the efforts of groups in the business
and labor communities interested in the creation and maintenance of a strong vocational program. The comparatively
rapid growth of vocational education in Minnesota owes a
great deal to this effective coalition.
Still another group that has begun to establish itself as a
lobby are the directors, advisers, and enrollees in community
education programs. Initiated in the 1960s when it was known
as the "lighted school house," this program has involved
groups previously unassociated with the schools. Because of
this program, community education directors seeking increased funding for their programs can now fill committee
hearing rooms with a wide range of enthusiatic citizens.
Essentially all of the educational interest groups are members of the BELL organization (Better Education Legislative
Liaison). This group gathers and shares information and
meets periodically during the session to informally discuss
legislation. The governor and legislative leaders meet on a
fairly regular basis with BELL, allowing decision makers to
communicate instantaneously with almost all education interest groups. Such meetings are useful to both sides as trial
ideas are discussed.
BELL also has held short conferences on subjects of general
interest to the education community such as special education aids, early childhood education, and staff maturity indexes. An out-of-state expert once stated in amazement that
never before in any state had he seen such dissimilar groups
conferring together, seeking a common goal. Although the
members of BELL can often agree on general approaches to
increased education funding, the organization recognizes
that there are different ways to achieve their goals. The members of BELL have not, therefore, ever united in support of or
in opposition to any specific funding issue. The authors believe that BELL's usefulness and continued existence depends
on its staying within this information gathering and sharing
format and not in becoming a super lobby group.

Others Who Influence Policy
The Department of Education has a primary duty of implementing legislative educational policy. The department is
also charged by the legislature with the gathering of a great
deal of information, and it serves, therefore, as the chief
repository of educational data. In addition, the legislature often establishes policy in a general way, leaving the department responsible for drawing up rules and regulations
needed to implement legislatic?n. These rules and regulations
are adopted officially by the State Board of Education after a
series of public hearings (presided over by an attorney employed as a State Hearing Officer). These rules and regulations have the force of law.
In the past there was little legislative oversight of departmental rule making. But during the last five to ten years, legis-
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lators, through their staff, have more diligently seen that
interpretation of the law through departmental rules coincides with the legislature's original intent. Consequently, the
policy-making powers of the legislature have been enhanced
in this arena.
During each legislative session the education committees
process legislation known as Departmental Bills. The majority of these bills are housekeeping in nature; that is, they do
not involve policy-making. They seek instead to alter current
statutes so as to make their administration more manageable.
Departmental staff monitor committee meetings in order to
be prepared to testify whenever legislators seek their expertise on policy matters, data, or housekeeping bills. ··
The role of the Department of Education during the legislative session includes presenting and defending the governor's education budget, processing departmental bills, and
providing information to committees as needed. The department's responsibility for the governor's budget and education initiatives was significantly changed in the 1983 session
when the legislature provided for the direct appointment of
the commissioner of education by the governor. Before that
time the commissioner had been appointed by the State
Board of Education with the approval of the governor.
The commissioner now has the clear responsibility for
shepherding the governor's initiatives through the legislative
process. Meanwhile, the State Board of Education has been
authorized to employ its own staff person to assist in accomplishing the board's objectives. The department's and commissioner's legislative responsibilities are carried out by the
legislative liaison, a position that has been held by a deputy
commissioner, an assistant commissioner, and department
civil service staff personnel. Although the liaison is not labeled a lobbyist, the duties are similar and include communicating with and educating legislators regarding the
governor's and department's education program and funding
priorities. The departmental civil service staff also are responsible to the State Board of Education. This divided responsibility has the potential to produce significant problems if the
State Board of Education is in disagreement with the governor on any major issue.
The Department of Education's legislative liaison assumes
the responsibility for the department's presence at the legislature. This includes assuring that appropriate department staff
are available to testify at committee meetings when information or expertise is needed, monitoring committee hearings,
managing departmental housekeeping bills, as well as managing the governor's budget initiatives.
In the process of fashioning the budget request, the governor may rely on the department to provide support data for
any policy initiative being developed. However, history has
shown that Minnesota's chief executives may choose to use
the State Planning Office, their own staff, and increasingly, the
Department of Finance as alternatives to Department of Education personnel in developing policy.
It seems safe to say that during the 1970s and early 1980s the
department has done less to initiate change than to serve as an
enforcement agency and information gatherer. That role
could be altered should the governor or key legislators decide to use the department differently. For example, during
the Quie administration the department was asked to develop
a formula variation for basic education funding, which was
the basis of the Quie education budget. Although the formula
was not adopted, it did serve as a model for later changes initiated by the legislature.
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Ruth Randall, more than any other commissioner of education in recent memory, has led the department in creating major initiatives for change in education policy. Although it is too
early to determine what the result of these initiatives will be,
the attempt to exert leadership from the department level is
significant. Since legislative leaders had developed pilot
legislation similar to some of the department's initiatives, it
may be difficult in the long run to clearly ascribe credit for
changes in these areas.
The State Board of Education is composed of nine members appointed by the governor. Although appointments to
the Board of Education are political in the sense that IR and
DFL governors name candidates from their political parties,
the appointments have little partisan significance. Boards of
Education have not held distinct philosophical positions related to their political make-up.
The board, through the department itself and in cooperation with the commissioner, oversees the operation of the Department of Education. Except for some recent notoriety
associated with developing state desegregation guidelines,
the state board does not receive much publicity. Its affirmations of the legislative program brought to it by department
personnel typically create little controversy because, as indicated above, those issues are usually technical and procedural. Few Minnesotans can name any members of the board,
and a member's role in policy formation is seldom significant.
The governor can dedde to play an important role in educational policy-making. A press conference called by the governor commands an audience. Senators and congressmen
live and act in distant Washington, D.C. , and while there are
201 state legislators, there is only one governor. The governor, therefore, can focus state attention on an educational issue more easily and more effectively than any other public
official. Wendell Anderson, for instance, made the education
aid formula a statewide issue. AI Quie did the same with K-3
class size, and Rudy Perpich has made transfer across district
lines a major issue. Governors may not always win but they
can direct the discussion.
The governor's primary governmental responsibility and
principal policy-making tool is the development of the biennial budget. Without dollars there can be no change in the
aid formula and no class-size alternatives. The governor,
through the Department of Finance, compiles the budget every two years. With annual sessions there is now a supplementary budget in even-numbered years, but the major budget is
prepared for the legislative session beginning in January of
each odd-numbered year.
The governor typically establishes firm budgetary guidelines for each department, including the Department of Education. In recent years there has been a tendency to instruct
each department to hold the line. If a new program is sought,
an old one must be dropped or curtailed. The department is
thereby placed in a difficult role. Educators look to the commissioner of education, the State Board, and Department of
Education staff to serve as advocates of public education. The
commissioner, board, and department accept this role and
work hard to increase education funding within the executive
budget process. However, once the budget process is completed, Department of Education personnel are bound, as
part of the executive team, to support the governor's budget.
Consequently, strained relations can develop within the
education community during the legislative session; education interest groups complain that there is not enough money
for education while the department, commissioner, and
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

board must defend the budget, claiming that adequate funds
are provided. During the heat of the battle, strained relations
can form within the education community.
Whenever the governor chooses to actively pursue an educational policy change, as noted earlier, rationale and background information can be assembled in several ways. In
1971 Governor Anderson relied heavily on one of his own
staff. John Haynes, a particularly skillful aide, worked with
both the State Planning Agency and Department of Education
staff in preparing background data. The authors of the governor's state aid bill looked to Haynes for their needed staff support. As noted by Dr. Tim Mazzoni, the commissioner of
education "was not a participant in the main policy decisions"( 4).
When Governor Quie championed the K-3 class-size issue
in 1979, he relied less on his own staff and more on the State
Planning Agency, Department of Education personnel, and
several education interest groups. There was no figure comparable to Haynes on the Quie staff in 1979. Key personalities
in the current Perpich administration initiatives include several members of the State Planning Agency and Department
of Finance staff, including]ohn Haynes and the commissioner
of education.
Mentioned last in our discussion are the most powerful of
the educational policy-makers: those legislators who serve on
the Senate and House Education Aids committees. These men
and women are responsible for developing the approximately 200-page bill known as the Omnibus Education Aids
Act. The Aids Bill has provided a shortcut for amending educational policy, as many non-monetary items find their way into
this encyclopedic bill. Each year the Omnibus Bill is put together by Senate and House Education Aids committees composed of about ten legislators. The chairpersons are two of
the most powerful legislators in the state. Under their guidance the committees devise the formula whereby billions of
state dollars are funneled into the public school districts. Although Senate and House caucus leaders outline the general
dollar boundaries within which the committees must operate, a certain latitude is given, leaving the means of distribution clearly within the province of the committee.
Because the funding formula has become increasingly
complex, few legislators are familiar with its intricacies. This
places awesome responsibility in the hands of those legislators and legislative staff who are assigned to the Education
Aids committees.
Senate and House legislators independently develop their
versions of the Omnibus Bill. These bills may differ in many
ways. A legislative conference committee of five senators and
five representatives is chosen to reconcile the differences between the two bills. Major educational policy decisions are
made as consensus is reached. The conference committee
must reconcile differences between the two versions quickly
since the committee is seldom formed prior to the last weeks
of the legislative session. A number of decisions are made in
informal meetings between house and senate committee
chairs and two or three of their staff. These decisions are almost always ratified by the full conference committee. The
conference committee's report may not be amended on the
House or Senate floor; it must be accepted or rejected in total.
In practice, then, the deliberations of this group are crucial;
this handful of legislators, along with committee and research
staff, plays a central role in the development of public education policy.
During the 1970s, the number and importance of legislaVolume 51, Number 3, 1985/86

tive staff escalated dramatically. Legislative staff work yearround and with experience become highly skilled in their
area of assignment. Because their tenure may well overlap
that of the committee chairs with whom they work, they play
an important role in policy formation. While staff do not make
policy, they are often instructed to develop policy alternatives, and in the process of doing that they may become at least
partners in the process, depending on the legislators with
whom they work
As was mentioned earlier, the Department of Education is
responsible for providing information to legislators. By its
very nature, this duty bestows a certain power on the information providers. Prior to the addition oflegislative staff, department personnel had a near monopoly on the supplying of
educational data. In seeking reliable and timely information,
legislative leaders have encouraged the development of a reliable information base. For example, a uniform accounting
and reporting system has been legislatively mandated for all
school districts. This system, implemented via a statewide
computer network, makes available to legislators an almost
instantaneous financial profile of each school district. Computer terminals installed in Senate and House staff offices access a variety of education data bases on finance, state aids,
property taxes, and school staff, and provide the analytic tools
to use the data for policy formulation .
The authors conclude that, in the case of education funding, power resides principally in the hands of the governor,
who sets the discussion with his budget recommendations
and with a small group of legislators and legislative staff who
reconcile the differences between House and Senate bills in
all-important conference committee deliberations.

Recent Policy Directions
During the 1970s, policy changes were made to the 1971
Minnesota Miracle as legislators attempted to address emerging problems. This section will discuss those changes and
some of the factors that brought them about. The first change
permitted districts with below-average revenues and expenditures to access more revenue than other districts until they
had reached the revenue level guaranteed by the basic formula. Next, as more and more districts experienced rapidly
declining enrollment, the formula was adjusted to cushion
the revenue loss generated by the enrollment-driven formula. The declining enrollment provisions granted significant increases in the amount of state funding provided to
districts.
In spite of this, districts continued to reduce programs because of revenue shortages caused by a combination of enrollment decline, inflation, teacher salary increases, and
reduction of staff by seniority. To solve this fiscal problem,
districts increasingly asked voters to approve property tax increases through the unequalized referendum levy, a property
tax that has no associated state aid to assure an equal amount
of revenue for the same tax effort in different districts.
The major policy issue of the latter portion of the decade
thus became the question of access to revenue from the property tax base. With an unequalized property tax levy, districts
with high property values are able to access significantly more
revenue for a given rate of tax effort than are districts with low
valued property. Historically, property rich districts had been
able to access more revenue and, therefore, were able to
provide better programs for their students. The majority of
these districts were the metropolitan area districts repre7

sented by the AMSD. During the 70s these districts were also
experiencing the greatest financial difficulties due to declining enrollment and the tax levy limits of the new formula. This
combination of factors produced increasing pressure on the
governor and legislature to allow districts more freedom to
raise local taxes without voter approval in order to maintain
programs. Governor Quie supported this concept and urged
that local school boards be given the ability to levy one or two
mills above the formula-allotted amount without a voter referendum.
Legislative leaders of both parties resisted the urgings of
the governor and the AMSD, reasoning that allowing an onequalized mill levy would permit rich districts access to substantial funds while property poor districts with the same
effort would raise minimal amounts. The 1971 formula had
been adopted to counteract precisely this problem. The legislature, in 1979, did agree to a limited local levy authority on an
equalized basis. Districts were guaranteed that if they levied a
mill locally, they would receive the same amount per pupil as
was raised by one mill on the basic formula. As with other
equalized formulas, the difference was covered by state aids.
A property rich district would raise most of these funds
through the property tax levy while the poor districts would
levy the same mill rate but would get most of their funds from
the state. While high spending districts have applauded the
addition of the discretionary levy concept to the formula ,
many still support total access to local wealth, contending that
if you have it, you should be able to spend it. If local residents
resist increased property taxes, advocates insist, they can vote
out the offending school board.
Many influential legislators oppose this concept because
they feel that already unequal educational opportunities
would be accented. They contend that if students live in a
property rich district, and if that district is willing to spend,
programs would be expanded. Some students would therefore have drama, debate, advanced academic courses, foreign
languages, etc., while others would not. Because the Minnesota constitution guarantees a general and uniform system of
education, these legislators believe they have a duty to equalize course offerings. In response, wealthy districts argue that
equalizing has meant bringing superior education programs
down to average. This debate is certain to continue with new
solutions such as different types of formulas and interdistrict
cooperation being suggested as solutions to the problem of
program equity.
The 1971 formula has not been as successful as some of its
earliest advocates hoped it would be in increasing program
variety in property poor districts, which have received increased state funds. While studies in other states with similar
formulas have noted staff and program additions in poorer
districts, in Minnesota this trend has not been as pronounced.
This may be partly accounted for by the fact that Minnesota has
had an enollment decline greater than the nation as a whole
(5).
In Minnesota many outstate schools are still program poor.
Statewide differences in curriculum offerings for students in
grades 7-12 are so dramatic one has to wonder at the justice of
the situation. At the same time, faculty salaries, while quite
similar at beginning levels, show enormous differences at the
middle and top ranges of the salary schedule ( 6). Rural legislators are expresing a growing concern at this clearly visible,
and difficult to justify, differential.
At the same time that concerns about curriculum started to
grow in the late 1970s, the formula changes made during that
8

decade began to have an impact on the state budget. Because
many of the formula additions, such as declining enrollment
aid, were funded totally from state revenue, the state commitment to education funding grew rapidly. Certain formula provisions, however , continued to be funded through
unequalized levies. The revisions made by the 1979 legislature produced a formula in which most provisions were a
combination of equalized levy and state aid. The mechanisms
used to accomplish this produced two problems that would
require attention in the future: basing the formula on historical costs and enrollment changes, and an increased reliance
on the property tax for support of education.
The early 1980s were a period of fiscal constraint and crisis
caused by economic recession as well as tax policy changes.
These years were dominated by cuts in state spending in all
areas including education and produced little in the way of
major policy changes. Nevertheless, in 1982 Governor Quie
had the Department of Education develop a new approach to
the formula for education funding in Minnesota. Although the
Quie formula was not adopted, it did provide some groundwork for the formula adopted by the 1983 legislature and
Governor Perpich.
It is hoped that this new formula will provide for more balance in program offerings between districts by equalizing access to revenue among the districts . The new formula
eliminates historical spending patterns that were locked into
the previous formula and provides for cost differentials for
districts that have high costs due to a highly trained and experienced teaching staff and for districts with a low enrollment
scattered over many square miles. The formula provides a basic level of funding for all districts, adjusts this amount for the
cost differentials, and then provides additional equalized
levies at the option of the local districts. As the district elects to
access more revenue, the amount of state equalization declines. Except for cost-based differentials, all districts have access to the same revenue at the same equalization rate. It is
hoped that this access to revenue will be used by districts to
equalize programs and salaries throughout the state. The formula provisions are to be phased in over a four-year period
beginning with the 1984-85 school year, so it will be some
time before an analysis of the impact of the formula will be
available.
While the Minnesota legislature was settling into the hope
of equal access that the decennial formula change would
bring, another crisis was developing that would divert legislative attention from funding to issues related to curriculum,
student learning, and quality. The national report, "A Nation
At Risk," as well as many other similar reports, turned policy
attention to a new set of issues. While other states infused massive amounts of money into their educational systems, Minnesota moved more slowly to develop and pilot low-cost
initiatives for excellence. These initiatives were outgrowths
of local district, Department of Education, commissioner of
education, gubernatorial, and legislative ideas. The initiatives
include new legislative interest in the quality of teaching and
learning in Minnesota, as well as a continuing concern about
how to equalize student access to the state's educational programs. The initial policy decisions include new state funding
for staff and curriculum development, technology utilization,
and instructional effectiveness programs.
Another area of widespread interest involves providing additional choice to students within the public school system.
Governor Perpich has traveled throughout the state urging
the legislature to enact an open enrollment policy allowing
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

students to attend the public school of their choice in order to
gain access to the academic programs they desire. The governor has also advocated a Minnesota state high school for the
arts and another that would concentrate on science and mathematics. The Minnesota Business Partnership, new to the educational policy scene, funded a major study of education in
Minnesota and produced a report calling for increased quality, increased choice for students, and a major restructuring of
teaching and learning in the state.
With a major new formula for education funding ; with
growing concerns about quality, program access, and exc~l
lence· and with new players in the policy arena, the remamder of the decade should provide immense opportunity and
challenge to the principal educational policy-makers in Minnesota: those legislators sitting on the key Senate and House
education committees.
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